The Effects of the Length of the Tax-Loss Carryback Period on Tax Receipts and Corporate Marginal Tax Rates by John R. Graham & Hyunseob Kim
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFECTS OF THE LENGTH OF THE TAX-LOSS CARRYBACK PERIOD









We thank Peter Merrill for helpful comments on a previous draft. The views expressed herein are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by John R. Graham and Hyunseob Kim. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.The Effects of the Length of the Tax-Loss Carryback Period on Tax Receipts and Corporate
Marginal Tax Rates
John R. Graham and Hyunseob Kim




We investigate how the length of the net operating loss carryback period affects corporate liquidity
and marginal tax rates. We estimate that extending the carryback period from two to five years, as
recently proposed in President Obama’s budget blueprint, would provide $19 ($34) billion of additional
liquidity to the corporate sector for 2008 (2009). Our calculations imply that the benefits of the extended
carryback period would be concentrated in the homebuilding, automobile, and financial industries.
Extending the carryback period would increase the marginal tax rate of loss firms by more than 200
basis points on average, which all else equal would lead corporations to use an additional $8 ($10)
billion of debt and reduce tax payments by another $1.2 ($1.5) billion in 2008 (2009). Overall, the
tax break proposed by the Obama administration would have a significant liquidity effect on corporations
suffering large losses in recent years. If the tax proposal were extended to include TARP firms, the
liquidity effect would triple in size.
John R. Graham
Duke University












In January 2009, then-President-elect Barack Obama and congressional Democrats 
proposed a $300 billion tax cut package. One proposal was to increase the length of the net 
operating loss (NOL) carryback period from two years to five years for losses realized in 2008 
and 2009. The loss carryback feature of the tax code allows corporations to obtain a refund today 
for taxes paid in the recent past. For example, with a five year carryback period, losses 
experienced in 2008 could be carried back and used to offset positive income earned during the 
period 2003 to 2007, and tax payments associated with this offset income would be refunded in 
2008. The proposed increase in the carryback period would be particularly helpful for the 
corporate sector given that many U.S. corporations paid record-level income taxes during the 
economic boom from 2003 to 2007 but are not expected to be profitable in 2008 and 2009.  
The initial proposal was anticipated to apply to businesses of all sizes. However, the final 
stimulus package (called the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009") restricts 
the extension of the carryback period to businesses with revenues under $15 million a year. 
Moreover, the bill allows those small businesses to carry back losses that occurred in tax years 
beginning or ending in calendar year 2008 only, instead of both 2008 and 2009. 
At the time of this writing (May 2009), however, the Obama administration is once again 
considering whether to expand the carryback extension to large firms for both years 2008 and 
2009, as laid out in the $3.6 trillion budget blueprint, which includes about $18.5 billion of 
anticipated tax relief
 via the extended tax-loss carryback period (Corkery and Drucker, 2009). 
Given this context, we examine the economic consequences of extending the carryback period to 
five years. In particular, we study loss carryback effects using two types of evidence. First, we 
estimate the aggregate amount of liquidity that the federal government would provide to the   2
corporate sector via additional tax refunds by increasing the carryback period for 2008 and 2009. 
This exercise also amounts to estimating the cost of the tax cut to the U.S. federal government. 
Second, we examine the effect of the carryback extension on corporate marginal tax rates 
(MTRs), and in turn the effect that the change in MTRs would have on the corporate proclivity to 
use debt financing. Our analyses of large firms and the year 2009 are hypothetical. However, 
given that an earlier tax cut plan included firms of all sizes and covered both 2008 and 2009, and 
particularly because this plan can be revived through the federal budget process, we think that 
our analysis is relevant to corporations and policymakers. 
Estimating the liquidity that corporations would receive through extending the length of 
the carryback period involves developing a complex algorithm to compute taxable income 
adjustments and tax refunds under various carryback periods. Furthermore, because we do not 
have access to the corporate tax return data, we are constrained to rely on public data sources 
(e.g., Compustat) and financial statement data. Therefore, we start by benchmarking our 
algorithm and estimates of taxable income data by replicating Cooper and Boynton (2004, CB), 
who look at the effect of the NOL carryback period change for 2001. Importantly, CB have 
access to actual Internal Revenue Service corporate tax return data via the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury. Hence, if we are able to approximate the results in CB (2004), it will provide some 
reassurance that our algorithm and taxable income data sources are reasonable. 
Table 1 shows that our approach closely matches CB’s analysis of 2001. Even though our 
sample consists of a smaller number of firms, Panel A shows that aggregate total assets and 
taxable income in our replication are similar to those of CB. More importantly, our calculation of 
tax-loss carrybacks and tax refunds under the carryback period of one through five years matches 
very closely with that in CB. For example, CB show that total tax refunds for the two (five) year   3
carryback period were about $11.9 ($22.3) billion in 2001, and our computation produces an 
estimate of $13.3 ($23.5) billion. Overall, the replication results suggest that our approximation 
of the tax return data and relevant tax code is close to the actual data and algorithm. 
Given that our approach seems reasonable, we proceed to analyze the hypothetical effects 
of a five-year carryback period in 2008 and 2009. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In 
Section 1, we illustrate the economic impact of the extension of the tax-loss carryback period by 
examining a sample firm, Pulte Homes, for 2008. Section 2 discusses issues related to sample 
construction and summary statistics for our samples. In Section 3, we discuss the liquidity effect 
of the tax-loss carryback period change on the corporate sector. In Section 4, we examine 
changes in corporate marginal tax rates due to the tax break and the consequences for corporate 
debt usage. Section 5 investigates the implications of excluding the firms aided by the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) from the tax relief. The final section concludes. 
 
1. An Illustration: Pulte Homes, Inc. 
To illustrate the economic effects of the proposed tax relief on corporations, we examine 
the expected tax refund and change in the marginal tax rate for Pulte Homes, Inc., one of the 
largest home builders in the U.S. Pulte is a good candidate to illustrate the potential impact of the 
carryback period increase because like most home builders, it paid a record amount of income 
taxes over the 2003-2006 housing market boom but experienced large losses in 2007 and 2008. 
Therefore, it would be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the tax cut, if the carryback period were 
to be increased to the proposed five years. Reports indicate that the 13 largest home builders are 
expected to recoup about $2.4 billion of tax refunds in 2009 by electing the five-year carryback 
rule (Corkery and Drucker, 2009).   4
Table 2 shows that according to our calculations, Pulte Homes recorded about $2.0 
billion of tax losses in taxable year 2008 alone. It also recorded about $2.7 billion in losses in 
2007 but saw comparable profits in each year from 2003 to 2006 (see Column “Taxable Income” 
for detailed figures). Therefore, the firm would have carried a large part of the losses in 2007 
back to 2005 and 2006 (i.e., exploiting the standard two-year carryback rule) to generate a 
substantial tax refund. For taxable year 2008, if the tax-loss carryback period remains at the 
current two years, the company would expect to carry back only $1.1 billion out of a total loss of 
$2.0 billion, receiving $386 million in a 2008 tax refund. In contrast, if the carryback period is 
extended to five years, Pulte would be able to carryback all of the current year’s losses ($2.0 
billion) to offset tax liabilities from an additional three years (2003-2005) when the firm was 
highly profitable. As a result, the company would be eligible for a tax refund of $695 million, 
which is an increase of $309 million from the refund based on the standard two-year carryback. 
Given that this incremental tax refund amounts to about one-fifth of Pulte’s average after-tax 
income earned during the 2003-2006 boom years, the liquidity effect of the proposed increase in 
the carryback period appears substantial, at least in the case of Pulte Homes. 
In addition to providing corporations with liquidity, an increase in the length of the 
carryback period can also affect corporate marginal income tax rates. Recall that a MTR 
measures the present value tax consequences of earning an extra dollar of income today. As an 
example, consider a firm that made $1 million annually, each year from 2003 to 2007, and 
expects to earn $1 million in annual profits from 2009 on. If the company had a $5 million loss 
in 2008, under standard two-year carryback rules, it would carry back two-fifths of the loss to 
receive (in 2008) a refund for taxes paid in 2006 and 2007. This company would then carry 
forward the remaining $3 million loss to shield income in 2009, 2010, and 2011 from taxes. Now   5
let’s determine this company’s MTR, assuming a discount rate of 10% and a tax rate of 35%. If 
this company were to earn an extra dollar of income in 2008, this would mean its loss would be 
only $4,999,999 in 2008, and the company would have one less dollar of loss to carryforward to 
shield income in 2011. Therefore, under the two-year carryback rules, this company’s MTR on 
an extra dollar of 2008 income is 26.3% (
3 ) 1 . 0 1 /( % 35 + = ). Now, if the carryback period were 
extended to five years, the company would carry back all of its 2008 loss, to receive refunds for 
taxes paid from 2003 to 2007, and have nothing left to carry forward. To determine this firm’s 
marginal tax rate, we add $1 to 2008 income. Now the firm’s tax refund is $0.35 smaller in 2008, 
so earning an extra dollar in 2008 results in 2008 taxes that are $0.35 higher, or a MTR of 35%. 
Therefore, in this simple example, the effect of extending the carryback period to five years is an 
increase in the company’s MTR from 26.3% to 35%.  
Turning back to Pulte Homes, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the estimate of the marginal 
tax rate
1 for Pulte Homes in 2008 is only 3.3% in the two-year carryback period scenario. Note 
that Pulte’s MTR is not zero, even though it is not profitable in the current year. This is because 
in 2008 it can (i) carry a part of current losses back to year 2006 (but not to 2007, because it was 
a loss year), and (ii) carry forward the remaining losses up to 20 years, shielding some of the 
taxes that would be paid in future profitable years. The effect is that the marginal tax rate is far 
lower than the top statutory rate (35%) because the firm experiences large losses, so there is a 
substantial tax-loss carryforward (pushing the consequences of earning an extra dollar today far 
into the future).  In contrast, if the firm is allowed to carry back losses to the past five years, 
Pulte is able to carry back all losses that occurred in 2008. As a result, tax losses in 2008 are 
                                                 
1 See Section 4 for a description of the procedure to estimate the marginal tax rate.   6
completely offset by past profits and the firm’s MTR in 2008 equals the top statutory marginal 
tax rate (35%). 
The marginal tax rate affects many corporate decisions, including compensation, hedging, 
and debt policy. In particular, an increase in the MTR from 3.3% to 35% could lead to non-trivial 
changes in corporate debt usage because any increase in the marginal tax rate implies an 
increased tax benefit of incremental debt. We return to this issue in detail for a broad sample of 
firms in Section 4. Overall, results in this section illustrate how an increase in the length of the 
NOL carryback period can provide substantial liquidity in the form of a tax refund to a tax-loss 
firm and also alter its marginal tax rate. 
 
2. Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
We use Compustat data to investigate the implications of increasing the tax-loss 
carryback period for 2008 and 2009. Before discussing the sample construction procedure, we 
note several caveats of using Compustat data to compute taxable income and tax-loss carrybacks. 
First, given that we do not have access to the tax return data, we can only approximate the true 
taxable income and tax liability of firms using Compustat variables, which are based on financial 
statement filings. Second, the Compustat-based taxable income measure we construct includes 
income from operations outside the U.S., which is generally not taxable under the U.S. tax code. 
Third, for simplicity we ignore some features of the tax code that can affect corporate tax 
liabilities such as the alternative minimum tax (AMT) and various tax credits. Despite these 
caveats, as far as we can tell our computations yield results close to those based on actual U.S. 
tax return data, given that our results from replicating Cooper and Boynton (2004) are consistent 
with their original results as shown in Table 1.   7
We construct our sample from firm-quarter observations in the Compustat quarterly 
database for taxable years ending in 2008 and 2009. We require that taxable income data are 
available for all of the past five years to compute the five-year tax-loss carryback and that total 
book assets are at least $1 million to exclude firms that potentially have noisy data. For this 
sample of firms, we construct annual data for 2008 and 2009 using the Compustat and Standard 
and Poor’s Research Insight databases as described in Appendix A. In particular, the appendix 
discusses how we fill in missing data for 2008 and forecast data for 2009. Note that in our main 
analysis, we exclude Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and firms that received funds from the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) of the U.S. federal government
2 (hereafter referred to as “TARP 
firms”), because the original Senate proposal as well as the recently proposed budget blueprint 
suggests that it would not allow those firms to elect the five-year carryback period. However, in 
Section 5, we repeat part of the analysis for all firms including those bailed out by government 
funds to examine the potential impact of the tax break if TARP status were not considered in the 
application of the 5-year carryback extension. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for samples that exclude (Panel A) and include 
(Panel B) the TARP firms. Both in 2008 and 2009, about one-half of the firms in the samples 
record net losses. The aggregate return on assets, computed as the ratio of aggregate taxable 
income to total assets, ranges from -9.0% to -6.1% (from 0.0% to 3.4%) for loss (all) firms 
across samples and years. Overall, the statistics in this table suggest that the effect of the 
economic downturn on corporate profitability is severe and many firms in our sample suffer (are 
expected to suffer) tax losses in 2008 (2009). 
 
                                                 
2 Notable firms that have received TARP funds include AIG, Citigroup, and General Motors. The bailout of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac is separate from the TARP and instead was authorized by the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, which was passed in July 2008.   8
3. Liquidity Effect of Increased Carryback Period Length on Corporate Sector 
Table 4 presents our estimates of tax-loss carrybacks and tax refunds for the firms in the 
non-TARP sample in 2008 and 2009. If the carryback period is two years for 2008, about $102 
billion (29% of total losses) would be carried back to offset past tax liabilities from the previous 
two years.
3  Consequently, companies in the sample would generate an aggregate tax refund of 
$36 billion. Strikingly, if the proposed five-year period is implemented for small and large firms, 
and thus they can use losses from 2008 to offset the past five years (2003-2007) of taxable 
income, the total amount of tax-loss carryback would be about $158 billion (45% of total losses 
incurred during the year). Thus, extending the carryback period increases the carryback amount 
by 54%. Importantly, the incremental cash infusion to the corporate sector from moving from a 
two-year to five-year carryback period amounts to $19 billion (and the total tax refund is $55 
billion, which equals the $36 billion under the two-year carryback plus an incremental $19 
billion if the carryback period is extended). 
Our calculations suggest that the change in the carryback period would generate an even 
larger incremental tax refund in 2009. If firms are allowed to apply their 2009 losses to profits 
earned during the previous five years, the anticipated 2009 tax refund would almost double from 
the figure based on the two-year carryback (from $42 billion to $76 billion).
4 This incremental 
tax refund to corporations due to the increased length of the carryback period amounts to 31% of 
the average aggregate taxable income over the previous five years ($19 billion / $62 billion) for 
taxable years ending in 2008 and 47% ($34 billion / $73 billion) for taxable years ending in 2009. 
                                                 
3 Note that all calculations, including this $102 billion, are above and beyond carrybacks and carryforwards that 
already occurred based on losses from 2007 and earlier. 
4 This is above and beyond carrybacks that would occur with a five year carryback period in 2008. 
   9
The flip side of this increase in tax refund is a decrease in federal tax revenue. According 
to our computation, the proposed tax break would reduce federal tax receipts by $19 billion and 
$34 billion for taxable years ending in 2008 and 2009, respectively.
5 This is a significant cost for 
the federal government, particularly compared to the tax revenue reduction of $35 billion for 
taxable years ending in 2001 and 2002 combined when a similar tax break was applied. 
 
3.1 Who are the Winners? 
In this section, we examine by industry the amount of an additional tax refund due to the 
proposed tax break. Table 5 classifies firms into industries according to their three-digit SIC 
code and reports the ten industries that are expected to receive the largest tax refund. 
Unsurprisingly, many industries in the financial sector, such as surety insurance, savings 
institutions, and commercial banks, represent the top beneficiaries in 2008 and 2009.
6 As 
mentioned in the media, the home building industry would be one of the top beneficiaries of the 
tax cut both in 2008 and 2009, with an estimated additional tax refund of $6.4 billion over the 
two years. One notable pattern in the table is that the top 10 industries account for more than 
60% of the tax refunds provided to the corporate sector. Thus, it appears that the benefit of the 
increased tax-loss carryback period is concentrated in a few industries, including financials and 
home builders. These are industries with record profits in 2003-2006 and huge losses in recent 
years. 
 
                                                 
5 The Department of the Treasury estimates that the initial revenue cost of the tax cut would be $63.5 billion, which 
is similar to our estimate of $53 billion for 2008 and 2009 combined. Our estimate is conservative in the sense that 
we assume that firms would choose to elect the five-year carryback rule for taxable years ending in 2008 or 2009, 
while the federal government is expected to allow firms to choose either taxable years ending or beginning in 2008 
or 2009 to apply the extended carryback period. This flexibility may explain part of the discrepancy between the two 
estimates. 
6 Note that the sample excludes some of the largest financial institutions that record large losses in 2008 and 2009 
because we excluded the firms we were able to identify as having received government funding.   10
3.2 Are Large Firms Benefited More than Small Firms? 
After an increase in the length of the tax-loss carryback period was first proposed, small 
home builders argued that if the tax break were applied to firms of all sizes, it would greatly 
benefit large builders and allegedly put small builders at a competitive disadvantage. They 
argued that if large builders were allowed to use the expanded five-year loss carryback provision, 
they would take a “big bath” by dumping their properties for artificially low prices to take 
advantage of the extended loss carryback period (Corkery, 2009). Small builders claimed that if 
the large builders were to have “asset fire sales,” they would suffer large losses because of the 
depressed property prices, which might even result in many of the small companies going out of 
business. In fact, this friction between small and large home builders is thought to be one of the 
key reasons that large corporations were excluded from the tax provision at the last minute.  
In this section, we examine whether the extended carryback period would indeed benefit 
large firms more than small firms if it is implemented equally for both groups. Although our 
analysis is not directly related to the big bath argument stated by the small home builders, we 
believe that it sheds light on the broad question of whether the benefit of the tax break varies for 
different groups of firms. Since the implications from this analysis for 2009 are very similar to 
those for 2008, we only report results comparing small and large corporations for 2008. 
Results in Table 6 imply that by one measure large firms would possibly benefit 
disproportionally. Among the 1,892 loss firms in the 2008 sample, the largest half of firms (with 
mean total assets of $5.2 billion) are expected to receive an additional tax refund that amounts to 
5.7% of their total losses, while the smallest half of firms (with mean total assets of $42 million) 
are expected to generate an incremental refund of only 1.3% of total losses. This result is driven 
by the fact that small firms record larger losses (with an aggregate return on assets of -37%) than   11
large firms (with an aggregate return on assets of -7%) but they cannot recoup a proportional 
amount of tax refund by carrying-back the losses because the losses are quite large compared to 
profits made over the recent two to five years. However, if we scale the tax refunds by total 
assets, both large and small groups of firms appear to receive similar amounts of tax relief, 
namely 0.39% to 0.47% of total assets. 
In sum, compared to large firms, small firms suffer larger losses but receive tax refunds 
for a smaller portion of their losses – this occurs not due to larger losses but due to smaller past 
profits. In this sense, small corporations might be thought of benefiting less than large firms from 
the carryback tax relief. If large firms were to take a big bath to magnify losses in 2008 or 2009, 
this would accentuate the benefit to them of the carryback extension (while small firms would 
benefit less if at all because on average they already have exhausted the ability to fully utilize 
current losses, even before taking a big bath). Besides noting this carryback effect, we do not 
take a stand on whether the tax break would provide a competitive advantage to large firms. 
 
4. Expected Changes in Marginal Tax Rate and Debt Usage  
One important impact of an increase in the tax-loss carryback period is a change in the 
corporate marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate is an input into many corporate decisions such 
as capital structure, the cost of capital, and capital budgeting. Therefore, any significant change 
in MTRs may affect corporate policies regarding these decisions. In this section, we examine the 
extent to which the tax break changes corporate MTRs. Following the extensive literature on 
marginal tax rates, we measure the economic MTR as the present value tax consequences of 
earning an extra dollar of income today (Scholes et al., 2008). The current tax code allows firms 
to carry losses that occur today back in time, or alternatively to carry losses 20 years into the   12
future. Due to these dynamic features of the tax code, it is necessary to forecast taxable income 
in the future to determine the current-period economic MTR. In this paper, we employ the 
random walk model pioneered by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996b) to forecast future taxable 
income.
7 In the interest of brevity, we abstract from the details of the estimation method using 
random walk simulation and refer interested readers to Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996b). 
Table 7 shows that extending the tax-loss carryback period to five years causes changes 
in marginal tax rates on the full sample of firms (Panel A) and among loss firms (Panel B) in the 
sample. As discussed in the introduction, an increase in the carryback period would lead to 
higher (or at least no change in) MTRs for firms that experience losses. In contrast, MTRs for 
profitable firms would not change even if the carryback period is extended, because they do not 
have current losses to apply to past profits.
8 Therefore, we focus our discussion on loss firms in 
this section. In general, for firms that experience current period losses, the increase in the length 
of the carryback period is expected to lead to non-trivial changes in MTRs. For 2008 (2009), the 
mean marginal tax rate would change from 12.5% to 14.9% (from 13.5% to 15.7%). Particularly, 
the MTR of the loss firms at the 75
th percentile in 2008 (2009) would increase from 19% to 27% 
(from 19% to 34%). 
Panel C of Table 7 sorts the loss firms into six MTR groups and shows that there is 
considerable cross-sectional variation in changes in the MTR conditioning on the original two-
year-carryback MTR. For the firms whose two-year-carryback MTR is very close to the top rate, 
MTRs would not change much even if the carryback period is expanded to five years. However, 
                                                 
7 Recently, Graham and Kim (2009) show that using an alternative AR(1) income forecasting model can improve 
the estimation of the MTR. However, the qualitative results for the analysis in this paper, particularly changes in 
MTRs, are virtually the same whether the random walk or AR(1) model is used for income forecasting. Given the 
long-standing tradition of using random walk simulation, we present those results here. 
8 We ignore possible corporate behavioral adaptation to an extended carryback period, such as corporations taking 
big baths in 2008 or 2009.   13
for the other MTR groups, the marginal tax rate would increase by 1.8% to 4.1% on average due 
to the tax break. Overall, the results in the table indicate that for many of the loss firms, the 
proposed change in the tax code would have a material effect on their MTRs. 
To gauge the economic importance of these changes in MTRs, we study corporate debt 
policy. In particular, we determine the amount by which corporations’ incremental debt usage 
may increase, once the carryback period increases to five years, based on the estimated change in 
corporate MTRs. Graham (1996a) estimates that ceteris paribus a firm would increase its debt-
to-value ratio by 0.069% when its MTR goes up by 100 basis points. We apply Graham’s 
(1996a) result to estimate an increase in corporate debt usage responding to the change in the 
marginal tax rate due to the increased carryback period. Using his estimate, we find that the 
average loss firm in our 2008 sample would increase its debt-to-value ratio by 0.17% (2.4% × 
0.069%) when the tax cut is implemented. This increase in the debt ratio amounts to additional 
debt raised by corporations in the sample of approximately $8 billion (0.17% × $5,004 billion) if 
we proxy firm value with book value of assets. A similar calculation shows that the incremental 
debt usage by loss firms in 2009 would be about $10 billion.
9 This $8 ($10) billion increase in 
“debt capacity” for corporations in 2008 (2009), on top of the liquidity provided by the tax 
refund of $19 ($34) billion, would significantly improve financial flexibility for some of the loss 
firms. Furthermore, for 2008 and 2009, the increase in debt usage would provide those 
corporations with an additional tax savings of $1.2 billion (14.9% × $8 billion, which is MTR × 
                                                 
9 One could argue that the effective cost of debt has risen in 2008 and 2009 due to an increased probability of 
bankruptcy during the severe recession, and therefore, does it even make sense to consider incremental debt usage 
due to increased MTRs? Yes it does. Even if a perceived increase in the cost of debt has an overall dampening effect 
on corporate debt usage, the increased MTRs provide an offsetting benefit to debt usage which will attenuate any 
effects from increased costs. Thus, our estimates can be interpreted as either an increase in net debt usage, or a 
smaller decrease in net debt.   14
incremental debt usage) and $1.5 billion (15.6% × $10 billion), respectively, through increased 
interest tax shields, which increases the lost tax revenue for the federal government. 
 
5. Impact of Including TARP Firms 
The Obama administration’s current budget plan suggests that it would exclude Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and corporations that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program from electing the extended NOL carryback period. In this section, we examine the 
hypothetical impact of expanding the tax provision to those firms in terms of their liquidity 
position and federal tax receipts. Table 8 repeats the analysis in Table 4 using an extended 
sample including the TARP firms. Note that since the TARP firms include some of the largest 
U.S. corporations, the aggregate book assets in the sample increase by more than 70% with 
their inclusion, even though the number of TARP firms in the 2008 (2009) sample is only 52 
(50).  
The implications of including TARP firms are quite striking. If the increase in the 
carryback period applies to TARP firms as well as other firms, the total incremental tax refund to 
the corporate sector in 2008 (2009) would be $72 ($64) billion. That is, the additional tax cost to 
the federal government of providing liquidity to the small number of TARP firms in 2008 (2009) 
would be $53 ($29) billion. Another important implication of the analysis relates to the 
additional use of debt by loss firms. Although the increase in the average MTR is similar (about 
2.4%) whether we include or exclude TARP firms in the sample, the inclusion of those firms 
increases the total book value of  loss  firms  from  $5,004    to $12,256 billion for 2008. This 
increase makes the incremental debt usage by the corporate sector $21 billion (0.17% × $12,256 
billion), which is more than double the figure when excluding TARP firms ($8 billion). In sum,   15
including the corporations recently bailed out by the government would entail a large reduction 
in tax revenue, and a large increase in aggregate corporate liquidity, even though the number of 
TARP firms is small. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The net operating loss carryback feature of tax code is an effective mechanism through 
which the federal government provides liquidity to corporations exactly when they need it (e.g., 
during loss years or perhaps during a credit crunch or recession). In this paper, we examine the 
economic impact of the temporary change in the length of the carryback period from two to five 
years on corporate liquidity, federal tax receipts, and corporate marginal tax rates.  
We estimate that the proposed tax cut would inject about $19 billion of cash into the 
corporate sector for 2008 and an even larger $34 billion for 2009, which are significant amounts 
of liquidity for firms currently suffering losses. This tax break would be particularly valuable 
given that the marginal value of liquidity is much greater during a recession compared to “good” 
times. We also document that the tax cut would increase the marginal income tax rate for firms 
experiencing current operating losses. Importantly, this increase in the MTR would give the 
firms a greater incentive to use debt and also affect other tax-driven corporate decisions.  
Overall, our analysis indicates that the proposed increase in the tax-loss carryback period 
would provide significant liquidity to unprofitable corporations through tax refunds and 
increased debt capacity. Future research may examine the extent to which the liquidity provided 
by tax-loss carryback encourages firms to invest in profitable projects and stimulate the economy.   16
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Appendix A – Data Construction for 2008 and 2009 
We define taxable income using Compustat data as follows: 
 
Taxable Income = Operating Income after Depreciation [Data178] + Non-operating Income 
[Data61] - Interest Expense [Data15] - Deferred Taxes on Income Statement [Data50] / (top 
income tax rate) + Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations [Data48] / (1 - top income 
tax rate) + Special Items [Data17].  (A1)   
 
Since annual data for taxable year 2008 are not available for most of the Compustat firms 
at the time of writing (May 2009), we construct our annual 2008 data in the following steps. First, 
we create the taxable income measure in Equation (A1) using available quarterly financial 
statement data from the Compustat and Standard and Poor’s Research Insight databases.
10 
Second, for each firm that has non-missing first through fourth quarter data, we add up quarterly 
taxable income (i.e., from Q1 to Q4) to create annual taxable income. Third, for firms having 
missing third or fourth-quarter data from the Compustat and S&P Research Insight databases, we 
impute the missing values of taxable income using the industry mean change in return on 
assets.
11 Specifically, using the annual data that we construct in step 2, we compute the aggregate 
change in return of assets (sum of taxable income / sum of total assets) at the three-digit SIC 
industry level
12 (i) from the first half to the second half (i.e., from Q1 + Q2 to Q3 + Q4), or (ii) 
from the first three quarters to the fourth quarter of 2008. Then, we impute the missing second 
half or fourth quarter taxable income data assuming that each firm’s change in return on assets is 
                                                 
10 S&P Research Insight provides daily updates on many Compustat data items. 
11 We drop firm observations that have only first-quarter 2008 data because imputing the remaining three quarters 
may lead to an extremely noisy approximation. 
12 For firms with missing SIC code, we impute changes in profitability using all firms in the sample.   19
equal to its industry average. This procedure leaves us with actual data for about 77% of firms in 
the 2008 sample and estimated data for the remaining 23% of the firms.
13 
Constructing annual data for taxable year 2009 is even more challenging given that 
virtually no firm in the sample has filed its first-quarter results. Therefore, we take an intuitive 
but heuristic approach to forecast the taxable income data for 2009. We begin by assuming that 
the industry-level change in corporate profitability from 2008 to 2009 is similar to that from 
2001 to 2002, the most recent period of recession.
14 Specifically, for each industry we assume 
that the change in return on assets (sum of taxable income / sum of total assets) from 2008 to 
2009 is the same as from 2001 to 2002. Then, using the forecasted industry-level change in 
return on assets and 2008 data, we impute taxable income for 2009. 
                                                 
13 We impute third or fourth quarter data only for December fiscal year-ending firms in 2008, because (i) estimating 
changes in profitability could be very noisy for some other year-ending months (e.g., November 2008) given that 
only small numbers of firms exist in those month groups, and (ii) the estimation is simply infeasible for the other 
year-ending months (e.g., March 2009) as no firm in the groups has filed fourth-quarter data. 
14 The previous recession started in March 2001 and ended in November 2001. Recently, the economic cycle peaked 
in the second half of 2007 but the current recession (i.e., from peak to trough) is expected to last longer than the 
previous one, possibly extending to 2010. Therefore, our analysis for 2009 is probably conservative in that it may 
underestimate losses, and hence the effect of a five-year carryback period for 2009.   20
Figure 1  
Impact of Tax-loss Carryback Period Increase on Pulte Homes in 2008 
This figure compares tax-loss carryback and tax refund for Pulte Homes in 2008 for the carryback period 
of two years and five years. 
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Table 1 
Replication of Cooper and Boynton (2004) 
This table replicates key results in Cooper and Boynton (2004), who estimate tax liability adjustment and tax refund due to hypothetical changes in the NOL 
carryback period for taxable year 2001. Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample and Panel B presents tax-loss carryback and tax refund for differing 
lengths of carryback period. Cooper and Boynton (2004) use federal tax return data from the IRS, while we approximate their study using Compustat data. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Statistics 
Our Replication     Cooper and Boynton (2004) 
All Firms  Loss Firms     All Firms  Loss Firms 
N 5,150  2,188    27,384  9,088 
Total Assets (millions)  23,342,043  2,956,447    26,100,649  4,303,409 
Taxable Income (millions)  485,885  -226,858    442,705  -159,907 
Net Income (millions)  227,608  -218,827     322,621  -159,907 
 
Panel B: Tax-loss Carryback and Tax Refund 
 
Carryback Period 








1-year 20,757  7,257    26,989  7,403 
2-year 37,931  13,264    44,678  11,930 
3-year 46,424  16,232    55,238  15,056 
4-year 57,836  20,220    66,378  19,319 
5-year 67,359  23,547      74,999  22,283 
Diff [5-year - 2-year]  29,428  10,283     30,321  10,353 
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Table 2 
Impact of a Five-year Carryback Period on Pulte Homes, Inc. 
This table examines changes in tax-loss carryback, tax refund (Panel A), and the marginal tax rate (Panel B) due to a hypothetical increase in net operating loss 
(NOL) carryback period from two to five years for Pulte Homes in taxable year 2008. Note that this table shows the carryback of the 2008 losses only. We assume 
that the 2007 losses would be carried back to fully cover the $2,248 taxable profits in 2005 and $429 of the profits in 2006, leaving taxes paid on $1,102 of 2006 
profits not refunded. 
 




















2003 952  0  0    952  333    952  333 
2004 1,655  0  0    1,033  362    1,033  362 
2005 2,248  0  0    0  0    0 0 
2006 1,530  1,102  386    0  0    -1,102  -386 
2007 -2,677  0  0    0  0    0 0 
2008 -1,985  -  -    -  -    -  - 
Total  -  1,102  386     1,985  695     884  309 
 
Panel B: Marginal Tax Rate in 2008 
With the two-year carryback period, not all of the losses in 2008 are carried back, leaving some of the losses to be carried forward, which in turn reduces the MTR 
to 3.3%. In contrast, for the five-year carryback period case, the 2008 losses are all carried back, and thus the MTR is 35%. See text for details. 
 
Carryback Period  MTR in 2008 
2 year  3.3% 
5 year  35.0%   23
Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents key summary statistics for taxable years ending in 2008 and 2009. Panel A presents statistics for the main sample and Panel B presents statistics 
for an extended sample that also includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and firms that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. “Loss Firms” represent 
those that record net operating losses for a given year. Taxable income is defined in Appendix A, and return on assets is a ratio of aggregate taxable income to 
aggregate total assets. The number of firms decreases for taxable years ending in 2009 compared to 2008 because limitations in data do not permit the imputation 
of taxable income for taxable years ending between January and June of 2009. See footnote 13 in Appendix A for details. 
 
Panel A: Sample excluding TARP Firms 
 
Statistic 
2008    2009 
All Firms  Loss Firms     All Firms  Loss Firms 
N  4,432 1,892    4,106 1,984 
Total Assets (millions)  20,635,459  5,004,103    20,341,032  6,570,243 
Taxable Income (millions)  703,301  -351,689    342,224  -593,044 
Return on Assets  3.4%  -7.0%     1.7%  -9.0% 
 
Panel B: Sample including TARP Firms 
  
Statistic 
2008    2009 
All Firms  Loss Firms     All Firms  Loss Firms 
N  4,484 1,920    4,156 2,013 
Total Assets (millions)  36,484,343  12,256,344   34,217,670  13,565,936 
Taxable Income (millions)  351,696  -749,657    102,344  -882,996 
Return on Assets  1.0%  -6.1%     0.0%  -6.4%   24
Table 4 
Liquidity Effect of Different Length of Carryback Periods 
This table presents aggregate amounts of total net operating loss carryback and tax refunds, if the length of the carryback period hypothetically ranges from one to 
five years. Columns “Loss Carryback” present aggregate current tax losses that are carried back to all appropriate past years. For example, when the carryback 
period is three years, “Loss Carryback” represents a sum of losses in time t that are carried back to times t-1, t-2, and t-3. Similarly, columns “Tax Refund” present 
aggregate taxes refunded to corporations by carrying back current losses to all appropriate past years. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the estimated total losses for 
firms in the sample are $352 ($593) billion in 2008 (2009). 
  
Carryback Period 








1-year  54,115 18,934    41,363 14,474 
2-year  102,250 35,774    119,088 41,677 
3-year  126,302 44,191    140,051 49,011 
4-year  144,450 50,538    189,006 66,140 
5-year  157,571 55,125      216,857 75,880 
Diff [5-year - 2-year]  55,321  19,350     97,769  34,203   25
Table 5 
By-industry Analysis of the Benefit of Tax-Loss Carryback 
We classify industries based on three-digit SIC codes and compute aggregate tax refund due to NOL carryback by industry. For each industry, we compare tax 
refunds when the carryback period is two versus five years. Panel A (Panel B) presents the 10 industries that are expected to receive the largest tax refunds from 
the tax relief in 2008 (2009). 
 
Panel A: Top 10 most benefited Industries in 2008 
Industry  Three-digit 







Difference [5 year - 2 year]
(millions) 
Operative Builders  153  17  4,147  6,773  2,626 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment  371  26  668  2,725  2,057 
Surety Insurance  635  6  1,118  2,979  1,861 
Communications Equipment  366  56  1,758  2,859  1,101 
Miscellaneous Investing  679  57  1,181  2,278  1,097 
Newspapers 271  8  1,269  2,165  897 
Savings Institutions  603  43  491  1,348  856 
Commercial Banks  602  120  3,568  4,363  795 
Computer And Office Equipment  357  43  384  916  532 
Women's, Misses', and Juniors' Outerwear  233  3  268  790  522 
Sum - Top 10  -  379  14,853  27,196  12,343 
Total - All Industries  -  3,818  35,774  55,125  19,350 
 
Panel B: Top 10 most benefited Industries in 2009 
Industry  Three-digit 







Difference [5 year - 2 year]
(millions) 
Combination Electric, Gas, and Other Utility  493  53  5,879  9,737  3,858 
Operative Builders  153  16  36  3,841  3,806 
Commercial Banks  602  112  453  3,126  2,673 
Cable and Other Pay Television Services  484  14  2,515  4,644  2,130 
Personal Credit Institutions  614  5  68  1,708  1,640 
Communications Equipment  366  67  102  1,663  1,560 
Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Products  349  10  1,078  2,576  1,498 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment  371  22  9  1,315  1,306 
Newspapers 271  8  19  1,029  1,010 
Surety Insurance  635  5  0  991  991 
Sum - Top 10  -  312  10,159  30,630  20,471 
Total - All Industries  -  4,106  41,677  75,880  34,203   26
Table 6 
Tax Benefits for Small vs. Large Firms 
This table compares tax benefits from the increased carryback period for loss firms in 2008. We categorize a firm as large (small) if it has total assets bigger than 
(smaller than or equal to) median total assets among loss firms. The column “% Losses” (“% Assets”) presents the incremental aggregate tax refund due to the tax 
break divided by aggregate current losses (total assets) and the column “ROA” shows aggregate current taxable income divided by aggregate total assets. 
 
   N  Mean Assets 
(millions) 
Additional Refunds 
due to 5-year Carryback 
(millions) 
% Losses  % Assets  ROA 
Large firms  946 5,248  19,164  5.7%  0.39%  -7% 
Small firms  946 42  187  1.3%  0.47%  -37% 
Total 1,892  2,645  19,350  -5.5%  0.39%  -7%   27
Table 7 
Changes in Marginal Tax Rates 
Taxable income is simulated using Graham’s (1996b) method except that we ignore the AMT, and the marginal tax rate is computed based on the simulated 
income. For each observation, this procedure is repeated 50 times to incorporate uncertainty in income simulation, and the average of the computed MTRs is taken 
as the estimate of the MTR. Panel A compares the distribution of MTRs when the carryback period is two and five years for all firms in the sample. Panel B 
compares the MTR distribution only for firms that experience losses in a given year. Panel C sorts the loss firms in Panel B into six MTR groups and presents 
average changes in the MTR when the period is extended from two years to five years. 
 
Panel A: Changes in MTR Distribution for All Firms 
   2008     2009 
   2 year  5 year    2 year  5 year 
N 4,432  4,432    4,106 4,106 
Mean 23.0% 24.0%    22.8% 23.9% 
Std Dev  12.9%  12.7%     12.7% 12.6% 
 
Panel B: Changes in MTR Distribution for Loss Firms 
   2008     2009 
   2 year  5 year    2 year  5 year 
N 1,892  1,892    1,984 1,984 
Mean 12.5% 14.9%    13.5% 15.7% 
Std Dev  11.5%  12.9%     11.5% 12.7% 
Percentile                
0
th  0% 0%    0% 0% 
1
th  0% 0%    0% 0% 
5
th  0% 0%    1% 1% 
10
th  0% 1%    2% 2% 
25
th  3% 4%    5% 5% 
35
th  5% 6%    6% 7% 
50
th  9% 11%    10% 11% 
65
th  14% 17%    14% 17% 
75
th  19% 27%    19% 34% 
90
th  34% 35%    35% 35% 
95
th  35% 35%    35% 35% 
99
th  35% 38%    38% 38% 
100
th  39% 39%     39% 39%   28
Panel C: Changes in Average MTR by MTR Group 
 
MTR 
(based on 2-year carryback) 
2008     2009 
N  2-yr MTR  5-yr MTR  Change    N  2-yr MTR  5-yr MTR  Change 
0-1% 267  0.2%  2.6%  2.4%    130  0.4%  2.8%  2.4% 
1-5% 397  2.9%  7.0%  4.1%    404  2.9%  5.8%  2.9% 
5-10% 334  7.5%  10.5%  3.1%    471  7.4%  10.1%  2.7% 
10-20% 457  14.0%  15.9%  1.8%    501  13.9%  16.4%  2.5% 
20-30% 158  24.0%  26.5%  2.5%    141  23.8%  26.2%  2.4% 
30-39% 279  34.7%  35.0%  0.3%    337  34.9%  35.2%  0.3% 
Total 1,892  12.5%  14.9%  2.4%      1,984  13.5%  15.7%  2.2%   29
Table 8 
Liquidity Effect of Carryback Period Change for Sample including TARP Firms 
This table is a re-do of Table 4 (which excludes TARP firms) except that TARP firms are included. For the expanded sample that includes the firms that received 
the TARP fund, this table computes aggregate tax-loss carryback and tax refund for differing carryback periods. 
 
Carryback Period 








1-year 105,615  36,959    43,536 15,235 
2-year  213,778 74,809    136,707 47,844 
3-year 292,243  102,270    158,132  55,339 
4-year 361,302  126,436    249,577  87,339 
5-year  420,864 147,277      318,614 111,495 
Diff [5-year - 2-year] 
Including TARP  207,086 72,468      181,907 63,651 
Diff [5-year - 2-year] 
Excluding TARP  50,562 19,350      91,882 34,203 
 
 
 